Democracy and Decision
Do voters in large scale democracies reliably vote for the electoral outcomes most in their interest? Much of the literature on voting predicts that they do, but this book argues that fully rational voters will not, in fact, consistently vote for the political outcomes they prefer. The authors offer a theory of voting which they term an 'expressive' theory of electoral politics. This theory is shown to be more coherent and more consistent with actual observed voting behaviour. This important book offers a compelling challenge to the central premises of the prevailing theories of voting behaviour.
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|This book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521330404 and published in 1994.|
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