Author
Abstract
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, Swiss banks made significant Swiss franc loans to financial institutions in several European countries. By the fall of 2008, many of those Swiss banks were unwilling or unable to continue refinancing those loans. In mid-September 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, short-term interest rates in the Swiss franc money market rose significantly. Banks throughout Europe, particularly in Poland and Hungary, had borrowed Swiss francs and lent them to households to buy real estate. As their domestic currencies lost value relative to the Swiss franc, a relative safe haven currency, borrowers in these countries began to default, and the lending banks lost money on the loans they had made. In October 2008, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) entered a swap arrangement with the European Central Bank (ECB) to provide Swiss franc liquidity to euro area banks. The SNB then announced similar Swiss-franc-for-euro swap arrangements with two non-eurozone central banks, the Polish central bank, Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP), in November 2008 and the Hungarian central bank, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), in January 2009. In each case, the borrowing central bank would offer Swiss francs to financial institutions within its borders in downstream auctions that coincided with the SNB's domestic auctions. For the swaps in aggregate, the peak amount outstanding during the crisis period was about 39 billion Swiss francs (CHF; USD 34 billion) in March 2009, with most of that usage coming from the ECB. The SNB, ECB, NBP, and MNB announced the end of the downstream liquidity auctions in January 2010, by which time the condition of the European banking system had improved, interbank funding rates had fallen, and the swap lines were allowed to expire.
Suggested Citation
French, Jack, 2023.
"Switzerland: Central Bank Swaps to the Eurozone, Poland, and Hungary, 2008-2009,"
Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 5(1), pages 430-448, July.
Handle:
RePEc:ysm:ypfsfc:v:5:y:2023:i:1:p:430-448
Download full text from publisher
More about this item
Keywords
;
;
;
;
JEL classification:
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Statistics
Access and download statistics
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ysm:ypfsfc:v:5:y:2023:i:1:p:430-448. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/smyalus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.