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Cooperative Game with Agreements Implemented by a Third Party

Author

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  • Jeanpantz Chen

    (South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, 510640, P. R. China)

Abstract

In the literature of cooperative game theory, it is often assumed that there is only one coalition composed of all the players other than the dummies in a cooperative game of complete information, although the coalition formation is examined and the equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF) was defined in a repeated cooperative game of incomplete information. On the other hand, the blocking approach only provided several possible ranges of the distribution scheme of the cooperative payoff of a coalition in a cooperative game with agreements implemented by a third party, and the single point solutions provided are usually collectivistic.This paper examines the coalition formation in a cooperative game with agreements implemented by a third party, and provides the existence proof and an algorithm of the coalition equilibrium; moreover, this paper analyzes the equilibrium of the bargaining game on the distribution of the cooperative payoff of a coalition under the coalition equilibrium, and examines the distribution scheme of cooperative payoff of a coalition.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeanpantz Chen, 2021. "Cooperative Game with Agreements Implemented by a Third Party," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 23(03), pages 1-59, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:23:y:2021:i:03:n:s0219198920500218
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198920500218
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