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Game-Theoretic Principles of Decision Management Modeling Under the Coopetition

Author

Listed:
  • Iryna Heiets

    (College of Engineering and Management of National Aviation University, Kyiv, Ukraine)

  • Tamara Oleshko

    (College of Engineering and Management of National Aviation University, Kyiv, Ukraine)

  • Oleg Leshchinsky

    (College of Engineering and Management of National Aviation University, Kyiv, Ukraine)

Abstract

The paper considers the two main game-theoretic models, such as coalition and cooperative. The authors are of the opinion that definitions and notions of cooperative games and coalition games are different, but both games are coopetitive games. Transitivity and superadditivity are presented as the main characteristic functions of coopetitive games. The individual and collective rationality were identified as unconditional requirements for the optimal distribution between players. Furthermore, the additional income added to the guaranteed amount occurs in the event of coopetition. Any substantial coopetitive game has an infinite number of transactions. The authors highlighted that the dominant transaction is the transaction that is better for all coalition numbers without exceptions and it can be reached by the coalition. In addition, the authors propose using Shapley system of axioms to identify coopetitive game results.

Suggested Citation

  • Iryna Heiets & Tamara Oleshko & Oleg Leshchinsky, 2021. "Game-Theoretic Principles of Decision Management Modeling Under the Coopetition," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 23(01), pages 1-19, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:23:y:2021:i:01:n:s0219198920500103
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198920500103
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