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Pooling Risk Games

Author

Listed:
  • Tzvi Alon

    (Department of Statistics and Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel)

  • Moshe Haviv

    (Department of Statistics and Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel)

Abstract

There are numerous situations in which variability reduction is desirable. We examine cases where such reductions can be achieved by cooperating agents who share similar interests. Our goal is to quantify the contribution of each of the agents toward this reduction. We model this situation as a cooperative game in which the cost is defined as the minimal standard deviation the cooperating agents can achieve. We show that this game is subadditive and has a nonempty core. We derive special presentations for the Shapley and Banzhaf values.

Suggested Citation

  • Tzvi Alon & Moshe Haviv, 2020. "Pooling Risk Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 22(03), pages 1-28, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:22:y:2020:i:03:n:s0219198919500154
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500154
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