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Group Contest Success Function: The Heterogeneous Individuals Case

Author

Listed:
  • António Osório

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili (Department of Economics) and CREIP, Av. de la Universitat, 1, 43204 Reus, Spain)

Abstract

This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of the group contest success function in [Münster, J. [2009] Group contest success functions, Econ. Theory 41(2), 345–357] to groups with heterogeneous individuals (e.g., individuals with different skills or different cognitive capacities). The obtained function allows for differences in terms of effort effectiveness between the group individuals and differences in terms of returns to scale at the aggregate level.

Suggested Citation

  • António Osório, 2018. "Group Contest Success Function: The Heterogeneous Individuals Case," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(04), pages 1-8, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:20:y:2018:i:04:n:s0219198918500093
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198918500093
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    Keywords

    Group contests; multi-issue contests; success function; heterogeneity; characterization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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