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A Bargaining Model For Finite N-Person Multi-Criteria Games

Author

Listed:
  • LUISA MONROY

    (Department Economía Aplicada III, University of Seville, Avd. Ramón y Cajal, n. 1, Seville, 41018, Spain)

  • AMPARO M. MÁRMOL

    (Department Economía Aplicada III, University of Seville, Avd. Ramón y Cajal, n. 1, Seville, 41018, Spain)

  • VICTORIANA RUBIALES

    (Department Economía Aplicada III, University of Seville, Avd. Ramón y Cajal, n. 1, Seville, 41018, Spain)

Abstract

In this paper a multi-criteria game model, which allows interactions between players, is studied. The problem addressed is considered as a cooperative game in order to achieve consensus solutions which are evaluated with respect to several criteria simultaneously. The main idea consists of analyzing finite multi-criterian-person games as multi-criteria bargaining games. The notion of Pareto-optimal guaranteed payoffs as a generalization of the maximin values of scalar games is proposed, together with a solution concept which can be characterized as the solutions of multi-criteria linear programming problems. A procedure to incorporate additional information about the players' preferences in order to reach a final consensus is also provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Luisa Monroy & Amparo M. Mármol & Victoriana Rubiales, 2009. "A Bargaining Model For Finite N-Person Multi-Criteria Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(02), pages 121-139.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:n:s0219198909002212
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002212
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    Cited by:

    1. Juho Kokkala & Kimmo Berg & Kai Virtanen & Jirka Poropudas, 2019. "Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(2), pages 185-204, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Finite multi-criteria games; bargaining games; multi-criteria analysis; Subject Classification: 91A06; Subject Classification: 91A10; Subject Classification: 91A12;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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