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Beckmann'S Edgeworth-Bertrand Duopoly Example Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • ALEXEI F. CHEVIAKOV

    (Department of Mathematics, University of British, Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z4, Canada)

  • JOHN M. HARTWICK

    (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada)

Abstract

In the Edgeworth-Bertrand price game, each player has a capacity output, faces the same market demand, and calls out a price. The high-price caller gets some residual market at her price. The low-price caller gets her capacity at her price or all of the market. We re-work Beckmann's closed form solution to his symmetric version of this game, mostly in mixed strategies, and observe that expected price played by a player declines with the size of her exogenously given capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexei F. Cheviakov & John M. Hartwick, 2005. "Beckmann'S Edgeworth-Bertrand Duopoly Example Revisited," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 461-472.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:n:s0219198905000648
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000648
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    Cited by:

    1. Attila Tasnádi, 2016. "Endogenous timing of moves in Bertrand–Edgeworth triopolies," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 317-334, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bertrand duopoly; price game; Journal Classification: C72; Journal Classification: D43;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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