A Behavioral Model of Insurance Pricing
We develop a model of price competition between insurers where insurers maximize expected profit subject to a solvency constraint. Insurers base prices in part on expected losses, the estimates of which are updated in a Bayesian fashion. We assume that insurers are overconfident—they overestimate the precision of their private signal about expected losses. This leads insurers to overreact to their private signal on expected losses. The consequence is that prices may cycle and that the distribution of price changes may be positively skewed because of the role played by the solvency constraint.
Volume (Year): 30 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wri:journl:v:30:y:2007:i:1:p:46-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (James Barrese)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.