The Cost of Biased Insurer Ratings
Numerous firms offer competing ratings of insurer financial condition. Insurance consumers, producers, and others commonly puzzle over which rating is more accurate. A 1994 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report judged the performance of a group of these insurance rating agencies. That report focused on Type I error (i.e., too high a rating on an insurer that defaults) rather than an appropriate balance between Type I and Type II error (i.e., too low a rating on an insurer that is financially stronger than indicated by the rating). This study investigates the consequences of focusing on Type I errors. We assume that both the demand and supply of insurance are related to an insurer’s rating. Using these assumptions, a model demonstrates the theoretical existence of a set of optimal insurer ratings and the societal cost imposed by rating-induced deviations from this set.
Volume (Year): 21 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wri:journl:v:21:y:1998:i:2:p:138-150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (James Barrese)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.