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The Abilene Paradox: The Curse of Caring Too Much

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  • Lia Flores
  • Rachel Mannahan
  • Jin‐Yeong Sohn

Abstract

The Abilene paradox (AP) occurs when a group of people vote for an alternative that no one prefers, resulting in an inferior outcome. We show that in a sequential voting game, a combination of social preferences and incomplete information can lead to the AP. This model is tested in an online experiment. We find evidence suggesting that subjects vote according to the group's preference rather than their selfish preference, potentially leading to the AP. Moreover, we find a position effect: when subjects are the first to vote in the group, they are more likely to vote according to their selfish preference than when they are the second, third, and so on.

Suggested Citation

  • Lia Flores & Rachel Mannahan & Jin‐Yeong Sohn, 2026. "The Abilene Paradox: The Curse of Caring Too Much," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 92(3), pages 728-742, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:92:y:2026:i:3:p:728-742
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.70009
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