IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/revfec/v41y2023i3p219-241.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Industry tournament incentives and differential risk taking

Author

Listed:
  • Hussein Abdoh

Abstract

This study examines how industry tournament incentives affect chief executive officers' (CEOs') attitudes toward differential risk‐taking. The results show that these incentives cause a greater increase in taking systematic rather than idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, this differential risk‐taking manifests in a competitive business environment. The findings hold robust to the instrumental variable approach and variation in industry pay gap following the adoption of FAS123R. Overall, the results suggest that the industry pay gap effectively increases CEOs' systematic risk‐taking, especially in competitive industries.

Suggested Citation

  • Hussein Abdoh, 2023. "Industry tournament incentives and differential risk taking," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(3), pages 219-241, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:revfec:v:41:y:2023:i:3:p:219-241
    DOI: 10.1002/rfe.1173
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/rfe.1173
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/rfe.1173?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:revfec:v:41:y:2023:i:3:p:219-241. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)1873-5924 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.