IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/reggov/v19y2025i2p583-598.html

Guardians and Spenders in the Budgetary Process: More Than One Type of Relations

Author

Listed:
  • Ilana Shpaizman

Abstract

The budget is the outcome of bargaining between spenders and guardians. Most research on budgeting sees all spenders as a unitary actor. This article argues, instead, that there are different relations at play between guardians and each spending ministry. Based on a comparison between four social ministries in Israel, it shows that these relations differ in terms of the level of involvement of guardians in spenders' budgetary inputs and outputs, ranging from near‐complete autonomy within existing budget limits to tight budgetary control and interference in policymaking. The difference is a function of the perceived risk of overspending or ineffectiveness. When the guardian's level of involvement is high, the dynamic between the parties can be conflictual if they do not share the same policy ideas. In a conflictual dynamic, spenders have more chances of forcing their will on guardians if they can use their political power to stand up to them.

Suggested Citation

  • Ilana Shpaizman, 2025. "Guardians and Spenders in the Budgetary Process: More Than One Type of Relations," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(2), pages 583-598, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:19:y:2025:i:2:p:583-598
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.70002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70002
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/rego.70002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicole M. Deterding & Mary C. Waters, 2021. "Flexible Coding of In-depth Interviews: A Twenty-first-century Approach," Sociological Methods & Research, , vol. 50(2), pages 708-739, May.
    2. Amit Avigur-Eshel & Ronen Mandelkern, 2021. "Training the Public: Advancing Neoliberal Reforms Through Model Experiences," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 344-358, May.
    3. Hallerberg, Mark & Yläoutinen, Sami, 2010. "Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 45-62, April.
    4. Richard Allen & Yasemin Hurcan & Maximilien Queyranne, 2016. "The Evolving Functions and Organization of Finance Ministries," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 3-25, December.
    5. Hallerberg,Mark & Rainer Strauch,Rolf & von Hagen,Jürgen, 2010. "Fiscal Governance in Europe," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521138260.
    6. Thain, Colin & Wright, Maurice, 1995. "The Treasury and Whitehall: The Planning and Control of Public Expenditure, 1976-1993," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198277842.
    7. Mr. Jack Diamond, 2003. "Performance Budgeting: Managing the Reform Process," IMF Working Papers 2003/033, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Momi Dahan & Michel Strawczynski, 2020. "Budget institutions and government effectiveness," Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 32(2), pages 217-246, April.
    9. von Hagen, Jurgen & Hallerberg, Mark, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1555, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    10. Johan P. Olsen & James G. March, 2004. "The logic of appropriateness," ARENA Working Papers 9, ARENA.
    11. Sierd Hadley & Dirk-Jan Kraan & Bryn Welham, 2018. "Recent developments in the work of the Budget Office," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 18(2), pages 151-195.
    12. Jakob Haan & Richard Jong-A-Pin & Jochen Mierau, 2013. "Do budgetary institutions mitigate the common pool problem? New empirical evidence for the EU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 423-441, September.
    13. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April.
    14. Krause, Philipp, 2009. "A leaner, meaner guardian? A qualitative comparative analysis of executive control over public spending," IDOS Discussion Papers 22/2009, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    15. Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 209-232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Allen Schick, 2001. "The Changing Role of the Central Budget Office," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 9-26.
    17. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
    18. Swank, Otto H, 2002. "Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(3-4), pages 237-257, June.
    19. Wehner, Joachim, 2010. "Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28648, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vlaicu, Razvan & Verhoeven, Marijn & Grigoli, Francesco & Mills, Zachary, 2014. "Multiyear budgets and fiscal performance: Panel data evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 79-95.
    2. Hanna Bäck & Wolfgang C. Müller & Benjamin Nyblade, 2017. "Multiparty government and economic policy-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 33-62, January.
    3. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Grigoli, Francesco & Mills, Zachary & Verhoeven, Marijn & Vlaicu, Razvan, 2012. "MTEFs and fiscal performance: panel data evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6186, The World Bank.
    5. Lasse Aaskoven, 2018. "Budget institutions and taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 335-349, March.
    6. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2007. "Prudent Budgetary Policy: Political Economy of Precautionary Taxation," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/39, European University Institute.
    7. Marcela Eslava, 2011. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 645-673, September.
    8. Hansen, Daniel, 2020. "The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Sophia Gollwitzer, 2010. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Africa," Discussion Papers 10/02, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    10. Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2015. "National numerical fiscal rules: Not complied with, but still effective?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 67-81.
    11. Frederick Ploeg, 2010. "Political economy of prudent budgetary policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(3), pages 295-314, June.
    12. Foremny, Dirk, 2014. "Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-110.
    13. Nones, Nicola, 2025. "Do as I say, not as I do? Economists policymakers and fiscal consolidation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 90(PB).
    14. Hallerberg, Mark & Strauch, Rolf & von Hagen, Jurgen, 2007. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 338-359, June.
    15. Marc-Daniel Moessinger, 2014. "Do the personal characteristics of finance ministers affect changes in public debt?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 183-207, October.
    16. Ziogas, Thanasis & Panagiotidis, Theodore, 2021. "Revisiting the political economy of fiscal adjustments," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    17. Jeffrey Frankel, 2013. "A Solution to Fiscal Procyclicality: The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Jordi Galí (ed.),Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, edition 1, volume 17, chapter 9, pages 323-391, Central Bank of Chile.
    18. Jochimsen, Beate & Raffer, Christian, 2020. "Local Government Fiscal Regulation in the EU: The Impact of Balanced Budget Rules," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224566, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Blume, Lorenz & Voigt, Stefan, 2013. "The economic effects of constitutional budget institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 236-251.
    20. Mr. Brian Olden & Mr. Duncan P Last & Mr. Sami Yläoutinen & Ms. Carla Sateriale, 2012. "Fiscal Consolidation in Southeastern European Countries: The Role of Budget Institutions," IMF Working Papers 2012/113, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:19:y:2025:i:2:p:583-598. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1748-5991 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.