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An empirical model of non‐equilibrium behavior in games

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  • Brendan Kline

Abstract

This paper studies the identification and estimation of the decision rules that individuals use to determine their actions in games, based on a structural econometric model of non‐equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based primarily on various notions of limited strategic reasoning, allowing multiple modes of strategic reasoning and heterogeneity in strategic reasoning across individuals and within individuals. The paper proposes the model and provides sufficient conditions for point identification of the model. Then the model is estimated on data from an experiment involving two‐player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model.

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  • Brendan Kline, 2018. "An empirical model of non‐equilibrium behavior in games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 141-181, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:quante:v:9:y:2018:i:1:p:141-181
    DOI: 10.3982/QE647
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    Cited by:

    1. Victor Aguirregabiria, 2021. "Identification of firms’ beliefs in structural models of market competition," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 5-33, February.
    2. Barkley, Aaron & Groeger, Joachim R. & Miller, Robert A., 2021. "Bidding frictions in ascending auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 376-400.
    3. Dimitris Batzilis & Sonia Jaffe & Steven Levitt & John A. List & Jeffrey Picel, 2019. "Behavior in Strategic Settings: Evidence from a Million Rock-Paper-Scissors Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-34, April.

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