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Coalition Bargaining In Repeated Games

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  • Arnold Polanski
  • Fernando Vega‐Redondo

Abstract

We consider an intertemporal framework where different coalitions interact repeatedly over time. Both the terms of trade and the endogenous cooperation structure are characterized, in a protocol‐free manner, when: (C1)A coalition is formed with positive probability if, and only if, the shares obtained by its members weakly exceed their respective share expectations. (C2)Each matched coalition distributes the entire surplus among its members. (C3)Members of any coalition are treated symmetrically with respect to their share expectations. We show, in particular, that the cooperation structure and the shares are unique when the game ends each date with vanishing probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnold Polanski & Fernando Vega‐Redondo, 2018. "Coalition Bargaining In Repeated Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1949-1967, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:4:p:1949-1967
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12325
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