IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/empleg/v22y2025i3p361-377.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dispute Resolution in the Signaling Model: A Comparison of Arbitration Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Pecorino
  • Michael Solomon
  • Mark Van Boening

Abstract

We conduct an experimental analysis of signaling games using three models of arbitration. In the signaling model, the informed party in the dispute makes a settlement demand to the uninformed party. In conventional arbitration (CA), the arbitrator is free to impose her preferred settlement on the disputing parties. In Final Offer Arbitration (FOA), each party submits a proposal to the arbitrator who must choose one of the two submitted proposals. In one version of FOA we consider, settlement bargaining (which occurs separately from proposal submission) occurs prior to the submission of proposals and in one version it occurs after. We find the lowest dispute rate in CA and the highest dispute rate in FOA when settlement negotiations take place prior to the submission of proposals. The difference in dispute rates across these two mechanisms is 10 percentage points, which is about 25% of the average dispute rate. One factor in the lower CA dispute rate is that fewer disputes result from anomalous demands, which in turn may be a function of the simplicity of the mechanism compared with FOA.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Pecorino & Michael Solomon & Mark Van Boening, 2025. "Dispute Resolution in the Signaling Model: A Comparison of Arbitration Mechanisms," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(3), pages 361-377, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:22:y:2025:i:3:p:361-377
    DOI: 10.1111/jels.12420
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12420
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jels.12420?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:22:y:2025:i:3:p:361-377. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1740-1461 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.