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Voids or Fragmentation: Moral Responsibility For Collective Outcomes

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  • Matthew Braham
  • Martin van Hees

Abstract

Institutional rules create difficulties for the allocation of moral responsibility. One problem is the existence of responsibility voids, i.e. situations in which an outcome results from individual interactions but for which no one is responsible. Another is that responsibility can be fragmented in the sense that responsibility‐bearing individuals may be responsible for different features of the outcome. This study examines both problems together. We show that for a large class of situations the two problems are logically dependent. More precisely, non‐dictatorial decision procedures can only ensure the absence of voids if they allow for the fragmentation of responsibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Braham & Martin van Hees, 2018. "Voids or Fragmentation: Moral Responsibility For Collective Outcomes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(612), pages 95-113, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:612:p:f95-f113
    DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12507
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Maaser & Thomas Stratmann, 2021. "Costly Voting in Weighted Committees: The case of moral costs," Economics Working Papers 2021-11, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    2. Jobst Heitzig & Sarah Hiller, 2020. "Degrees of individual and groupwise backward and forward responsibility in extensive-form games with ambiguity, and their application to social choice problems," Papers 2007.07352, arXiv.org.

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