Author
Listed:
- Federico Revelli
- Tsung‐Sheng Tsai
- Roberto Zotti
Abstract
We study income tax competition in a structure of two adjacent two‐tier (federal‐regional) fiscal federations, where both upper‐tier and lower‐tier authorities tax income in the presence of income shifting within and between the federations. We show that when the federations are symmetric, horizontal competition leads to income‐shifting flows from rich regions (setting higher income tax rates) to poor regions (setting lower tax rates), both within and between federations. Moreover, income‐shifting facilities intensify tax competition, potentially increasing income redistribution from wealthier to poorer regions. However, in the case of asymmetric federations, the relationship between regional income tax rate and tax base and the resulting direction of inter‐regional income‐shifting flows are ambiguous due to the operation of vertical and diagonal fiscal externalities. Répartition des revenus, fiscalité et transferts dans une structure budgétaire fédérale. Nous étudions la concurrence en matière d'impôt sur le revenu dans un cadre composé de deux fédérations fiscales adjacentes à deux niveaux (fédéral–régional), où les autorités de chaque palier imposent le revenu en présence de transferts de revenu à l'intérieur et entre les fédérations. Nous montrons que, lorsque les fédérations sont symétriques, la concurrence horizontale engendre des flux de transferts de revenu des régions riches (ayant des taux d'imposition plus élevés) vers les régions pauvres (ayant des taux plus faibles), tant à l'intérieur qu'entre les fédérations. En outre, la possibilité de transférer les revenus accentue la concurrence fiscale, ce qui peut renforcer la redistribution du revenu des régions les plus riches vers les plus pauvres. Toutefois, dans le cas de fédérations asymétriques, la relation entre le taux d'imposition régional et l'assiette fiscale ainsi que la direction des flux de transfert de revenu entre régions deviennent ambiguës en raison des externalités fiscales verticales et diagonales.
Suggested Citation
Federico Revelli & Tsung‐Sheng Tsai & Roberto Zotti, 2026.
"Income distribution, taxation and shifting in a federal fiscal structure,"
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(2), pages 605-635, May.
Handle:
RePEc:wly:canjec:v:59:y:2026:i:2:p:605-635
DOI: 10.1111/caje.70055
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