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Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics

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  • Raya Kardasheva

Abstract

This is an article about package deals in EU legislative politics and their effects on policy outcomes. It analyzes interchamber exchange between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The main argument is that package deals allow Member States control over the financial aspects of legislation and ensure its timely adoption. In exchange, the Parliament gains access to some of the EU's most expensive policy areas. Intercameral logrolling is analyzed across all EU legislation completed in the period 1 May 1999–30 April 2007, including 2,369 issues, 1,465 legislative proposals, and 19 policy areas. The results indicate that package deals in the EU are conditional on the distributive nature of proposals and their urgency. In turn, through logrolling, the Parliament extends its influence in distributive policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Raya Kardasheva, 2013. "Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(4), pages 858-874, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:57:y:2013:i:4:p:858-874
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12035
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    Cited by:

    1. Karlson, Nils & Herold, Theo & Dalbard, Karl, 2022. "Ratio Working Paper No. 353: From free competition to fair competition on the European internal market," Ratio Working Papers 353, The Ratio Institute.
    2. Adam Kirpsza, 2023. "Quid Pro Quo. The Effect of Issue Linkage on Member States' Bargaining Success in European Union Lawmaking," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 323-343, March.
    3. José Luis Castro-Montero & Edwin Alblas & Arthur Dyevre & Nicolas Lampach, 2018. "The Court of Justice and treaty revision: A case of strategic leniency?," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 570-596, December.
    4. Vibeke Wøien Hansen, 2014. "Incomplete information and bargaining in the EU: An explanation of first-reading non-agreements," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(4), pages 472-495, December.
    5. Guerrero, Omar & Matter, Ulrich, 2021. "Quantifying Vote Trading Through Network Reciprocity," Economics Working Paper Series 2106, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

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