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Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results

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  • Jeffrey K. Staton

Abstract

A significant majority of the world's constitutional courts publicize their decisions through direct contact with the national media. This interest in public information is puzzling in so far as constitutional judges are not directly accountable to voters. I argue that the promotion of case results is consistent with a theory of judicial behavior in which public support for courts can undermine incentives for insincere decision making. In this article, I develop a simple game theory model that identifies how case promotion is linked to judicial choice. Results of a simultaneous equations model estimating the Mexican Supreme Court's merits decisions and its choices to publicize those decisions by issuing press releases to national media outlets support an account of constitutional review in which judges believe they can influence their authority through case promotion.

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  • Jeffrey K. Staton, 2006. "Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(1), pages 98-112, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:50:y:2006:i:1:p:98-112
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00172.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Emily Hencken Ritter & Courtenay R. Conrad, 2016. "Human rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 449-475, December.
    2. Jorge Ernesto Roa Roa, 2019. "Control de constitucionalidad deliberativo" El ciudadano ante la justicia constitucional, la acción pública de inconstitucionalidad y la legitimidad democrática del control judicial al legislador," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1119, October.
    3. Daniel Finke, 2020. "At loggerheads over state aid: Why the Commission rejects aid and governments comply," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 474-496, September.
    4. Tom S. Clark, 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 971-989, October.
    5. Yukihiro Yazaki, 2014. "Rights and judicial independence," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 179-201, May.
    6. Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, 2008. "The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 504-519, July.
    7. Michael Gilligan & Leslie Johns & B. Peter Rosendorff, 2010. "Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(1), pages 5-38, February.
    8. Courtenay R Conrad & Daniel W Hill Jr & Will H Moore, 2018. "Torture and the limits of democratic institutions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(1), pages 3-17, January.

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