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Gelockerte Schuldenbremse: Einhaltung der EUFiskalregeln wird wieder zur Herausforderung

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  • Büttner Thiess

Abstract

The changes to Germany’s constitutional debt limit (aka debt brake) adopted in March 2025 open up considerable additional scope for debt financing of public spending. However, not only must German fiscal policy observe the limits set by the German constitution, but the Stability and Growth Pact also restricts debt financing. Hence, there is a risk that the relaxation of the debt brake could bring Germany into greater conflict with EU fiscal rules, as was the case at the beginning of the European Monetary Union. Against the background of current fiscal planning, the article discusses the additional borrowing scope that exists now, the consequences for the development of the debt ratio, and whether and to what extent there is a risk of conflict with EU requirements. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the possibilities for ensuring compliance with the EU requirements within the framework of budgetary surveillance.

Suggested Citation

  • Büttner Thiess, 2025. "Gelockerte Schuldenbremse: Einhaltung der EUFiskalregeln wird wieder zur Herausforderung," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, vol. 105(4), pages 282-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:105:y:2025:i:4:p:282-287:n:1017
    DOI: 10.2478/wd-2025-0073
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H68 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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