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Mitte ohne Maß? Widersprüchliche Entlastungsforderungen

Author

Listed:
  • Bergmann Knut
  • Diermeier Matthias
  • Gensheimer Tim
  • Niehues Judith
  • Borgstedt Silke

Abstract

An empirical analysis of voters’ demands for redistributive measures during the energy crisis in Germany reveals three characteristic features of inconsistent preferences. First, although people favour targeted support for the disadvantaged, they deviate from this principle when confronted with policy proposals. Second, policies are often evaluated along party preferences, thus contradicting the exclusion of higher-income classes from support policies. Third, drawing on the Sinus-Milieu model, we identify different mentalities that lead to disapproval of the attitudes towards the disadvantaged. We conclude that managing expectations through policies and fostering personal responsibility on the part of both beneficiaries and benefactors of the welfare state will be crucial for successful future transition policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Bergmann Knut & Diermeier Matthias & Gensheimer Tim & Niehues Judith & Borgstedt Silke, 2023. "Mitte ohne Maß? Widersprüchliche Entlastungsforderungen," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, vol. 103(2), pages 130-136, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:103:y:2023:i:2:p:130-136:n:16
    DOI: 10.2478/wd-2023-0036
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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