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About The Future Of The Institution Of The Central Bank


  • POP, Napoleon

    (National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy)


The evolution of the financial crisis is touching more and more the future of the central banks by forcing them, for the sake of solutions to the sovereign debts, to do what in so far appeared almost impossible. We can presume such a future, but for the moment we have to observe that central banks, mainly those emitting money used as reserve currencies – for example FED or ECB – are confronted with a strong depletion of their monetary instruments (their monetary policy interest rates are around zero) and a great expansion of their balance sheet as an excuse for being the lenders of last resort. At this point, we have to discuss the perverse effect of reaching the minimum efficacy of the instruments used by the central banks regarded as institution and not only as policy makers enjoying a quite long historical building of their credibility and independence. The latest context of the expansion of their balance sheet is giving strong arguments of their implication in fiscal policy, which might ruin their credibility at a time when we say that the core problem of the global economy is the lack of trust of the investors. The same thing is true with their independence, both issues being conducive to the challenge to the future role of the institution of the central bank. The present realities, encompassing already more than five years of seeking solutions to the crisis still in evolution, incite us to tackle with the outcome for the central banks having in mind that the institutions becoming what we feel today as being central banks are under a certain pressure which is affecting exactly their core features giving to them the greatness we were proud of.

Suggested Citation

  • POP, Napoleon, 2012. "About The Future Of The Institution Of The Central Bank," Studii Financiare (Financial Studies), Centre of Financial and Monetary Research "Victor Slavescu", vol. 16(4), pages 6-22.
  • Handle: RePEc:vls:finstu:v:16:y:2012:i:4:p:6-22

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    central bank; crisis; monetary instruments; credibility; independence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies


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