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What do we know about the link between growth and institutions?

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  • Marta Spreafico

    () (Institute of Economic Policy. Catholic University of the Sacred Heart)

Abstract

The link between economic growth and institutions has been studied, theoretically and empirically, for more than ten years. The aim of this paper is to take stock of this literature in order to identify more precise and conscious directions for future research. First, we introduce the reference framework and raise some questions the literature should be able to answer. Then, we organise critically all the contributions so as to explain each result and the different paths undertaken. Finally, we conclude with several issues we believe deserve further attention.

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Spreafico, 2012. "What do we know about the link between growth and institutions?," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 120(4), pages 429-476.
  • Handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2012:v:120:i:4:p:429-476
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate income taxation; Capital taxation; CCCTB;

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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