IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal Exchange Rate Regimes: Sunspots, Currency Crises, and Welfare


  • Carsten Krabbe NIELSEN

    (Istituto di Politica Economica - Università Cattolica di Milano)


In this two country OLG model there is a potential role for active governments since markets are incomplete. There are many coordinated policies (exchange rate regimes) that result in an optimal allocation if extrinsic uncertainty plays no role. However, if we take into account the possibility of sunspot equilibria, the set of optimal policies is drastically reduced. Whenever there is a possibility of influence by extrinsic uncertainty, one or both governments may seek to avoid this by intervening on the foreign exchange markets. When only one country does so, this may lead to a currency crisis, where the central bank is active and is with positive probability unsuccessful in its attempt to defend its currency. If the two countries form a monetary union, a coordinated fiscal policy is needed as a substitute for an optimal exchange rate regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Carsten Krabbe NIELSEN, 2004. "Optimal Exchange Rate Regimes: Sunspots, Currency Crises, and Welfare," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 112(2), pages 155-194.
  • Handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2004:v:112:i:2:p:155-194

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Yes

    More about this item


    currency crisis; exchange rate policies; monetary union; OLG model; perfect currency;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2004:v:112:i:2:p:155-194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vep - Vita e Pensiero). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.