IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

lndipendenza delle banche centrali e coordinamento tra politica monetaria e politica fiscale

Listed author(s):
  • Giovan Battista PITTALUGA
  • Elena SEGHEZZA

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Finanziarie, Università di Genova)

In a mode1 à la Rogoff, with independent fiscal (AF) and monetary (AM) authority, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by an infiation rate and by a fiscal surplus lower than the ones desired by the two authorities. In the contract of performance approach, the coordination problem between monetary and fiscal policy is solved bringing back the AM preferences to those of the AF. In this way, monetary policy is not safeguarded by politica1 pressures. If one accepts the political business cycle approach, the relations between AF and AM are brought back to a multi-period context, rather than a one period context as in Rogoff and in the contract of performance approach. In this perspective, AM and AF, although both independent, can give rise to repeated games and to forms of coordination, spontaneous or «forced». The latter can be realized in institutional moments of negotiation between AM and AF or in normative constraints to the behaviour of AM and AF.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Yes

Article provided by Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in its journal Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali.

Volume (Year): 112 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 47-78

in new window

Handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2004:v:112:i:1:p:47-78
Contact details of provider:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2004:v:112:i:1:p:47-78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vep - Vita e Pensiero)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.