lndipendenza delle banche centrali e coordinamento tra politica monetaria e politica fiscale
In a mode1 à la Rogoff, with independent fiscal (AF) and monetary (AM) authority, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by an infiation rate and by a fiscal surplus lower than the ones desired by the two authorities. In the contract of performance approach, the coordination problem between monetary and fiscal policy is solved bringing back the AM preferences to those of the AF. In this way, monetary policy is not safeguarded by politica1 pressures. If one accepts the political business cycle approach, the relations between AF and AM are brought back to a multi-period context, rather than a one period context as in Rogoff and in the contract of performance approach. In this perspective, AM and AF, although both independent, can give rise to repeated games and to forms of coordination, spontaneous or «forced». The latter can be realized in institutional moments of negotiation between AM and AF or in normative constraints to the behaviour of AM and AF.
Volume (Year): 112 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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