Razionalità e libertà
Completeness and transitivity of preferences go a long way towards detennining what it is rational to do. This risks reducing being free to being rational or to being irrational. It is argued that in fact, preferences, and in particular abilities to perceive and evaluate, are, at least in part, chosen. Freedom is acquired by deciding which abilities of perception to endow oneself with and which criteria of evaluation to give preminente to, with all the problems of incommensurability and incompleteness this entails. So be free is to choose how to complete the orderings one arrives at, and to assume responsibility for this.
Volume (Year): 112 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2004:v:112:i:1:p:3-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vep - Vita e Pensiero)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.