IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nonbinding Peer Review and Effort in Teams: Evidence from a Field Experiment


  • Kristian Behrens
  • Matthieu Chemin


Individuals tend to free-ride in teams, thus providing inefficiently low effort. We implement a system of confidential peer review in a randomly selected set of teams, whereby teammates complete an online survey to review the effort of their peers. These reviews are not linked to any rewards or sanctions, thus making them nonbinding. We find that nonbinding peer reviews increase effort and team productivity and do not decrease worker morale. The effects are stronger for low-ability individuals in low-ability teams, where the traditional forces of peer effects may be absent.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristian Behrens & Matthieu Chemin, 2020. "Nonbinding Peer Review and Effort in Teams: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 55(4), pages 1365-1399.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:55:y:2020:i:4:p:1365-1399
    Note: DOI: 10.3368/jhr.55.4.0717-8907R2

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: A subscripton is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:55:y:2020:i:4:p:1365-1399. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.