The Effect of Incomes, Wages, and AFDC Benefits on Marital Disruption
This paper uses a choice-based model to estimate the effects of a broad set of economic factors, including AFDC benefit levels, husband's earnings, and a woman's wage rate, on the probability of marital dissolution. We find that the probability of divorce is lower for marriages in which the husband's labor income is higher. We also find that while AFDC income has a substantial effect on welfare receipt by a divorced woman, it has a relatively small effect on the probability that a married woman will become divorced. Finally, we find no support for the hypothesis that rising wages for women have increased marital instability.
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