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Disability Insurance: Error Rates and Gender Differences

Author

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  • Hamish Low
  • Luigi Pistaferri

Abstract

We show the extent of screening errors made in disability insurance awards using matched survey-administrative data. False rejections are widespread, with large gender differences. Work-disabled women are 12.8 percentage points more likely to be rejected than work-disabled men, controlling for health conditions, occupation, and demographics. Gender differences arise because women are assessed with more residual work capacity. We model the Social Security Administration (SSA) decision-making process and estimate that gender differences in screening errors originate from lower costs to the SSA from incorrectly rejecting women. Noise in self-reported work limitation leads to overstating screening errors, but the gender difference remains.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamish Low & Luigi Pistaferri, 2025. "Disability Insurance: Error Rates and Gender Differences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 133(9), pages 2962-3018.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/736207
    DOI: 10.1086/736207
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    Cited by:

    1. Naoki Aizawa & Soojin Kim & Serena Rhee, 2025. "Labour Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Labour Market for the Disabled," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(1), pages 1-39.
    2. Nicolò Russo & Rory McGee & Mariacristina De Nardi & Margherita Borella & Ross Abram, 2024. "Midlife Health and Later Life Economic Inequality," NBER Working Papers 32971, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Richard Blundell & Monica Costa Dias & Graham Mazeine & Costas Meghir & Tom Waters, 2026. "Labor supply and wages over the life cycle: human capital and disability benefits," IFS Working Papers W26/58, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    4. Soojin Kim & Serena Rhee, 2022. "Understanding the Aggregate Effects of Disability Insurance," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 46, pages 328-364, October.
    5. Pilar Garcia‐Gomez & Pierre Koning & Owen O'Donnell & Carlos Riumalló‐Herl, 2025. "Selective exercise of discretion in disability insurance awards," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 816-835, June.
    6. Ding Liu & Daniel L. Millimet, 2021. "Bounding the joint distribution of disability and employment with misclassification," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(7), pages 1628-1647, July.
    7. Ross Abram & Margherita Borella & Mariacristina De Nardi & Rory McGee & Nicolò Russo, 2024. "Health Inequality and Economic Disparities by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender," Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers 099, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    8. Agar Brugiavini & Petru Crudu, 2023. "The Role of Disability Insurance on the Labour Market Trajectories of Europeans," Working Papers 2023:20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    9. Ashesh Rambachan, 2022. "Identifying Prediction Mistakes in Observational Data," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of Artificial Intelligence, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Jung, Juergen & Shrestha, Vinish, 2025. "Medicaid work requirements, labor market effects and welfare," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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