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Sovereign Debt Ratchets and Welfare Destruction

Author

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  • Peter DeMarzo
  • Zhiguo He
  • Fabrice Tourre

Abstract

We study an impatient, risk-neutral government that cannot commit to a particular debt path, financed by competitive lenders. In equilibrium, debt adjusts slowly toward a debt-to-income target, exacerbating booms and busts. Strikingly, gains from trade dissipate when trading is continuous, leaving the government no better off than in financial autarky, owing to a sovereign “debt ratchet effect.” Moreover, citizens who are more patient than their government are strictly harmed. We characterize equilibrium debt dynamics, ergodics, and comparative statics when income follows a geometric Brownian motion and analyze devices that allow the sovereign to recapture gains from trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter DeMarzo & Zhiguo He & Fabrice Tourre, 2023. "Sovereign Debt Ratchets and Welfare Destruction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(10), pages 2825-2892.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/724571
    DOI: 10.1086/724571
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter M. Demarzo & Zhiguo He, 2021. "Leverage Dynamics without Commitment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 1195-1250, June.
    2. Sergio Rebelo & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2022. "Rare Disasters, Financial Development, and Sovereign Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(5), pages 2719-2764, October.
    3. Bloise, Gaetano & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2024. "Sovereign debt crises and low interest rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    4. Li, Yuan & Yang, Jinqiang & Zhao, Siqi, 2022. "Present-biased government and sovereign debt dynamics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
    • F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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