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CEO Compensation after Deregulation: The Case of Electric Utilities


  • Stephen Bryan

    (Babcock Graduate School of Management, Wake Forest University)

  • Lee-Seok Hwang

    (College of Business Administration, Seoul National University)

  • Steven Lilien

    (Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, CUNY)


The 1992 National Energy Policy Act (NEPA) intensified competition in the electric utility industry by allowing nonutility generators to produce and sell power in wholesale energy markets. Congress expected NEPA to lead to improved operating efficiencies by substituting market forces for regulation. A data set that is unique to the utility industry allows us to test how and whether utility firms reallocated resources to improve efficiencies and, more important for this study, whether CEO compensation changed in accordance with agency theory predictions that CEO compensation would become more incentive-based and more equity-based in the competitive operating environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Bryan & Lee-Seok Hwang & Steven Lilien, 2005. "CEO Compensation after Deregulation: The Case of Electric Utilities," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1709-1752, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:78:y:2005:i:5:p:1709-1752

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    Cited by:

    1. Petrov, Ivam & Chirkova, Evgeniya, 2012. "The Stock-Based Compensation Plans for Top Managemen," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-17.
    2. Hu, Fang & Tan, Weiqiang & Xin, Qingquan & Yang, Sixian, 2013. "How do market forces affect executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 78-87.

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