Incentive Regulation and Productive Efficiency in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry
This study evaluates the effect of incentive regulation on the productivity of U.S. local exchange carriers between 1988 and 1993. Introducing pure price-cap schemes has a strong and positive, but lagged, effect on technical efficiency. Where price-cap schemes operate in conjunction with an earnings-sharing scheme, there is immediate effect on technical efficiency, but the impact is less strong than the effect of a pure price-caps scheme. Where only an earnings-sharing scheme operates, its effect is detrimental to technical efficiency. Weaker, though broadly positive, results are obtained as to the effect of incentive regulation on scale efficiency. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.
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