Airline Mergers and Competition: An Integration of Stock and Product Price Effects
While research using stock prices has rejected the hypothesis that market power is important in motivating horizontal mergers, studies of airfares find evidence consistent with a dominant role of market power in airline mergers. The author integrates the two lines of research by examining the same set of airline mergers from a capital market viewpoint. Further, he links changes in the stock market to changes in the product market, presenting a dual market perspective. The author concludes that airline mergers result in both increased market power and more efficient operations. The article has implications for antitrust policy. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.
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