The Economics of Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities
When a symbol is desecrated, the desecrator obtains benefits while other people incur costs. Negative externalities are intrinsic to desecration, suggesting a case for government regulation if the costs exceed the benefits. The case for restrictions is especially strong because of the impracticality of Coasean bargaining and the possibility of efficient lawbreaking. In addition, desecration reduces the incentive for the creation and maintenance of symbols, which, like other goods, need property-rights protection for efficient production. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-69. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.