IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlstud/doi10.1086-733918.html

Punishment Menus

Author

Listed:
  • Mauricio Guim Alfago
  • Jonathan Klick
  • Murat C. Mungan

Abstract

Optimal law enforcement and regulation models generally assume a single punishment scheme. However, when there is unobservable heterogeneity in violation propensities, welfare can be improved by offering punishment menus to potential offenders ex ante. When this is done, individuals with low violation propensities will choose low audit probabilities and high penalties, while individuals with high violation propensities will choose high audit probabilities and low penalties. We present a formal model showing that allowing individuals to choose from a punishment menu improves social welfare relative to a single punishment scheme by simultaneously reducing auditing costs and enhancing deterrence. This model provides a rationale for some recently proposed citizen trust policies in which people can enter their identities in a public registry and be subject to less-demanding inspections.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauricio Guim Alfago & Jonathan Klick & Murat C. Mungan, 2026. "Punishment Menus," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(1), pages 1-27.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/733918
    DOI: 10.1086/733918
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/733918
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/733918
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/733918?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/733918. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.