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The Inevitability and Ubiquity of Cycling in All Feasible Legal Regimes: A Formal Proof

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  • Leo Katz
  • Alvaro Sandroni

Abstract

Intransitive choices, or cycling, are generally held to be the mark of irrationality. When a set of rules engenders such choices, it is usually held to be irrational and in need of reform. In this article, we prove a series of theorems, demonstrating that all feasible legal regimes are going to be rife with cycling. Our first result, the legal cycling theorem, shows that unless a legal system meets some extremely restrictive conditions, it will lead to cycling. The discussion that follows, along with our second result, the combination theorem, shows exactly why these conditions are almost impossible to meet. All of this has numerous implications to which we can only allude here. For one, it suggests why law is as susceptible to manipulation and exploitation of loopholes as it has proved to be.

Suggested Citation

  • Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, 2017. "The Inevitability and Ubiquity of Cycling in All Feasible Legal Regimes: A Formal Proof," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 237-280.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/693020
    DOI: 10.1086/693020
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    Cited by:

    1. Alvaro Sandroni & Leo Katz, 2024. "The leveling axiom," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 135-152, February.
    2. Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, 2021. "The (Non) Economic Properties of the Law," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-8, March.

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