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Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements and Forced Turnovers of Chief Executive Officers

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  • Yupeng Lin
  • Florian Peters
  • Hojun Seo

Abstract

We examine whether corporate boards factor the potential cost of competitive harm caused by a departing chief executive officer (CEO) into their forced-turnover decisions. Using staggered changes in the state-level enforceability of a covenant not to compete (CNC) for identification, we find that enhanced enforceability of CNCs increases both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. We present additional cross-sectional evidence that shows that such effects are more pronounced when firms face more severe product market threats or operate in industries with greater potential threats of predatory hiring. Investors react to turnover announcements more positively when enforceability increases, which indicates that enhanced enforceability of CNCs increases efficiency in decisions to replace CEOs.

Suggested Citation

  • Yupeng Lin & Florian Peters & Hojun Seo, 2022. "Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements and Forced Turnovers of Chief Executive Officers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(1), pages 177-209.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/716172
    DOI: 10.1086/716172
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    Cited by:

    1. Xiaohui Li & Yao Shen & Jing Xie, 2024. "Proxy Voting on CEO Pay: Evidence from Rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine," Working Papers 202412, University of Macau, Faculty of Business Administration.

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