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Chronic Disease Burden and the Interaction of Education, Fertility, and Growth

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  • Hoyt Bleakley

    (University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business)

  • Fabian Lange

    (Yale University)

Abstract

This study considers the eradication of hookworm disease from the American South (circa 1910) as a test of the quantity-quality (Q-Q) framework of fertility. Eradication was principally a shock to the price of quality because of three factors: hookworm (i) depresses the return to human capital investment, (ii) had a very low case-fatality rate, and (iii) had negligible prevalence among adults. Consistent with the Q-Q model, we find a significant decline in fertility associated with eradication. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoyt Bleakley & Fabian Lange, 2009. "Chronic Disease Burden and the Interaction of Education, Fertility, and Growth," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(1), pages 52-65, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:91:y:2009:i:1:p:52-65
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