Mergers, Cartels, Set-Asides, and Bidding Preferences in Asymmetric Oral Auctions
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- How NOT to implement a policy of discrimination
by Luke Froeb in managerial econ on 2012-02-01 04:45:00
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- Susan Athey & Dominic Coey & Jonathan Levin, 2013.
"Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, February.
- Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey, 2007. "Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions," 2007 Meeting Papers 571, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Susan Athey & Dominic Coey & Jonathan Levin, 2011. "Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions," Discussion Papers 10-017, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Susan Athey & Dominic Coey & Jonathan Levin, 2011. "Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions," NBER Working Papers 16851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2010.
"Merger Simulation In Competition Policy: A Survey,"
Journal of Competition Law and Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 277-319.
- Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2008. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200807, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2009. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," Working Papers 82/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
- Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003. " The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 287-304, Summer.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Motis, Jrissy, 2007. "Mergers as Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6434, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tong Li & Bingyu Zhang, 2015. "Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 188-214, May.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011.
"Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
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- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2008. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," NBER Working Papers 14590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2008. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-012, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2016. "Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition: The Case of the Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 257-288, August.
- Srabana Gupta, 2001. "The Effect of Bid Rigging on Prices: A Study of the Highway Construction Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(4), pages 451-465, December.
- Luke M. Froeb & Bernhard Ganglmair & Steven Tschantz, 2016.
"Adversarial Decision Making: Choosing between Models Constructed by Interested Parties,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-548.
- Froeb, Luke M. & Ganglmair, Bernhard & Tschantz, Steven, 2016. "Adversarial decision-making: Choosing between models constructed by interested parties," MPRA Paper 71501, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Charles J. Thomas, 2017. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Working Papers 17-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Gugler, Klaus Peter & Weichselbaumer, Michael & Zulehner, Christine, 2015. "Analysis of mergers in first-price auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gregory Werden & Luke Froeb & James Langenfeld, 2000. "Lost Profits from Patent Infringement: The Simulation Approach," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 213-227.
- Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, 2007.
"The Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contemporary Merger Control,"
Marburg Working Papers on Economics
200702, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Arndt, 2007. "The Oracle/PeopleSoft case: unilateral effects, simulation models and econometrics in contemporary merger control," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 157, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Business and Economic Studie (IBES).
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