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The Growing Reluctance To Borrow At The Discount Window: An Empirical Investigation

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  • Stavros Peristiani

Abstract

Federal Reserve Regulation A imposes formal guidelines on borrowing from the discount window and ensures that the facility is used for appropriate purposes. In a way, this regulation imposes a nonprice mechanism that compels depository institutions to be more prudent in exercising their borrowing privileges. In the 1980s, however, banks became increasingly more reluctant to borrow adjustment credit from the discount window. This behavior is puzzling because discount window guidelines have not changed. This paper investigates the reasons behind the weakened demand for borrowed reserves. Our empirical findings suggest that the growing reluctance to borrow stems from the deteriorating financial position of banks during this period. In particular, banks avoided the discount window because they feared that market participants might have interpreted their visits as a signal of serious funding difficulties. © 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog

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  • Stavros Peristiani, 1998. "The Growing Reluctance To Borrow At The Discount Window: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 611-620, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:80:y:1998:i:4:p:611-620
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    Cited by:

    1. Armantier, Olivier & Ghysels, Eric & Sarkar, Asani & Shrader, Jeffrey, 2015. "Discount window stigma during the 2007–2008 financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 317-335.
    2. repec:eee:jbfina:v:83:y:2017:i:c:p:193-220 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Furfine, Craig, 2001. "The reluctance to borrow from the Fed," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 209-213, August.
    4. Bartolini, Leonardo & Prati, Alessandro, 2006. "Cross-country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates' volatility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 349-376, February.
    5. Rosalind L. Bennett & Mark D. Vaughan & Timothy J. Yeager, 2005. "Should the FDIC worry about the FHLB? The impact of Federal Home Loan Bank advances on the Bank Insurance Fund," Working Paper 05-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    6. Jimmy Melo, 2014. "Expectativas cambiarias, selección adversa y liquidez," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(1), pages 27-62, May.
    7. Elizabeth C. Klee, 2011. "The first line of defense: the discount window during the early stages of the financial crisis," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-23, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, 2012. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 1-28, February.
    9. Güntner, Jochen H.F., 2015. "The federal funds market, excess reserves, and unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 225-250.
    10. Leonardo Bartolini & Giuseppe Bertola & Alessandro Prati, 2000. "Banks' reserve management, transaction costs, and the timing of the Federal Reserve intervention," Staff Reports 109, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    11. Luís Fonseca & Matteo Crosignani & Miguel Faria-e-Castro, 2015. "Central Bank Interventions, Demand for Collateral, and Sovereign Borrowing Costs," Working Papers w201509, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    12. Prati, Alessandro & Bartolini, Leonardo & Bertola, Giuseppe, 2003. "The overnight interbank market: Evidence from the G-7 and the Euro zone," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 2045-2083, October.
    13. Nicole Boyson & Jean Helwege & Jan Jindra, 2014. "Crises, Liquidity Shocks, and Fire Sales at Commercial Banks," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 43(4), pages 857-884, December.
    14. Christopher Hoag, 2015. "Clearinghouse Loan Certificates as a Lender of Last Resort," Working Papers 1503, Trinity College, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2015.
    15. Thomas B. King, 2003. "Discipline and liquidity in the market for federal funds," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2003-02, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    16. Bartolini, Leonardo & Bertola, Giuseppe & Prati, Alessandro, 2001. "Banks' reserve management, transaction costs, and the timing of Federal Reserve intervention," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 1287-1317, July.
    17. Céline Gauthier & Alfred Lehar & Héctor Pérez Saiz & Moez Souissi, 2015. "Emergency Liquidity Facilities, Signalling and Funding Costs," Staff Working Papers 15-44, Bank of Canada.
    18. Huberto Ennis & John Weinberg, 2013. "Over-the-counter loans, adverse selection, and stigma in the interbank market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 601-616, October.
    19. Benjamin M. Blau & Scott E. Hein & Ryan J. Whitby, 2016. "The Financial Impact Of Lender-Of-Last-Resort Borrowing From The Federal Reserve During The Financial Crisis," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 39(2), pages 179-206, June.
    20. Helwege, Jean & Boyson, Nicole M. & Jindra, Jan, 2017. "Thawing frozen capital markets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed's liquidity programs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 92-119.
    21. Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Inbae, 2007. "Endogenous selection of monetary institutions: With the case of discount windows and bureaucratic discretion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 330-350, September.
    22. Dutkowsky, Donald H. & McCoskey, Suzanne K., 2001. "Near integration, bank reluctance, and discount window borrowing," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1013-1036, June.
    23. John A. Weinberg & Huberto M. Ennis, 2009. "A Model of Stigma in the Fed Funds Market," 2009 Meeting Papers 956, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    24. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Jennie Bai & Charles-Henri Weymuller, 2016. "Measuring Liquidity Mismatch in the Banking Sector," NBER Working Papers 22729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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