Does the Baseball Labor Market Contradict the Human Capital Model of Investment?
This paper examines whether experienced players in Major League Baseball are paid more than their contribution to team revenue. The author shows that wages increase with experience independently of productivity gains. The results, therefore, contradict the human capital model of investment. The evidence is in fact consistent with implicit contract models because most older players are relatively overpaid. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.
Volume (Year): 74 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/|
|Order Information:||Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00346535|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:74:y:1992:i:2:p:261-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Pollock-Nelson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.