The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea
This paper uses the data of 227 North Korean refugees who have settled in South Korea to investigate the relationship between working in the informal economy (market component of the economy) and bribe-giving, and between bribe-giving and the number of hours worked in the formal sector (planned component of the economy). The first relationship is positive, and the second relationship is negative. These results imply that widespread informal economy activities in North Korea have been undermining the socialist regime through bribery. © 2011 The Earth Institute at Columbia University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 10 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/asep|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:asiaec:v:10:y:2011:i:3:p:104-117. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kristin Waites)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.