Judicial Independence as a Guarantee of the Separation of Powers in the Republic of Kosovo: Institutional Safeguards and Practical Challenges

This scientific paper analyses judicial independence in the Republic of Kosovo as a functional precondition of the separation of powers, rather than as a professional privilege of judges. The paper examines the constitutional and legal safeguards that protect the judiciary from interference by the legislative and executive branches, namely the constitutional proclamation of independence, the hybrid system of appointment and dismissal of judges, the security of tenure, judicial immunity, the position of the Kosovo Judicial Council as a self-governing body, and the arrangements governing the judicial budget. It further examines the practical challenges that reduce the effectiveness of these safeguards, including the probationary mandate of newly appointed judges, the discretion exercised in performance evaluation and disciplinary proceedings, the dependence of the judiciary on the executive in budgetary matters, and the constitutional and legal implications of the vetting process. The methodology applied consists of the descriptive method, the legal analytical method and the comparative method, supported by the analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the opinions of the European Commission for Democracy through Law. From the research it results that the normative framework of the Republic of Kosovo is broadly aligned with European standards, while the effectiveness of the safeguards depends on institutional practice rather than on the text of the law, and that the principal risk to the independence of the individual judge has partly shifted from the political branches towards the internal hierarchy of the judicial system itself.