Development, democracy, and dependence in the Southern Cone: political coalitions, stabilizing mechanisms, and their hazards

This article explores the challenge of sustaining development-oriented political coalitions in ‘dependent intermediate democratic economies’ (IDDEs). Scholars have pointed out that the absence of upgrading coalitions in IDDEs, particularly in Latin America, results from weak economic and political institutions and fragmented political support, as well as from the political and social turbulences introduced by economic dependency. Our argument, however, is that some Latin American IDDEs have managed to craft semi-stable political configurations capable of sustaining development and reform processes with relative success. These intermediate coalitions pivot on context-specific stabilization mechanisms that balance institutional, political, and economic fragilities and tensions. To support this argument, we take issue with three countries in Latin America’s Southern Cone – Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay – and distinguish three different types of stabilization mechanism at play in each of these cases: an Argentine-style variant based on the hegemonic role played by a dominant political party, a Chilean-style variant based on elite consensus and the atomization of collective organization, and a Uruguayan-style variant sustained by stable links between and within economic and social sectors. Additionally, we explore how each of these configurations, due to their structure, carry inherent hazards that envision specific trajectories of destabilization.