Think globally, act locally? Domestic constraints on foreign aid

Some democratic governments prefer a more ambitious and generous development policy than others. These governments hold stronger preferences for realizing the sustainable development goals defined by the UN, including the eradication of poverty, the right to education, the protection of human rights, and the safeguarding of the environment in developing countries. Yet, the extent to which democratic governments can realize their preferred development policies varies significantly. In this article, I analyze the discrepancies between governments’ development policy preferences and the level of official development assistance (ODA) they provide. On the theoretical side, I analyze governments’ discretion to increase their level of ODA. Specifically, I argue that unified governments that face weak institutional constraints find it easier to transfer their ambitious development policy preferences into higher levels of ODA. On the empirical side, I study the level of ODA in 33 OECD countries over a period of 23 years. Analyzing speeches at the UN General Assembly, I apply an innovative operationalization of governments’ concern for global development. My findings support the argument that governments’ discretion in domestic politics facilitates an increase of ODA.