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The electoral logic of governor rotations in Ukraine: rulers’ authority, party strength, and regional polarization

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  • Masatomo Torikai

Abstract

How and under what conditions do authoritarian rulers use the state apparatus to help ensure victory? To answer this question, this paper examines electoral mobilization as a rationale for the appointment of governors in hybrid regimes. Given their absolute authority to use administrative resources, autocratic rulers prefer governors who can perform well in mobilizing the electorate in their favor. However, several circumstances make this strategy suboptimal or impossible. To provide empirical evidence supporting this argument, this study conducts a survival analysis using an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments and dismissals in Ukraine from 1996 to 2017. The results confirm that electoral performance was the primary driver of governor appointments during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. In addition, it is demonstrated that various institutional conditions, such as party strength, the weak authority of the ruler within the central government, and regional polarization resulted in the adoption of different appointment strategies by subsequent presidents.

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  • Masatomo Torikai, 2019. "The electoral logic of governor rotations in Ukraine: rulers’ authority, party strength, and regional polarization," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(3), pages 258-276, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rpsaxx:v:35:y:2019:i:3:p:258-276
    DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2019.1589683
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