‘The assisting hand’ or ‘the grabbing hand’: experimental evidence from PPP investments in the implementation of official rotation systems

In the context of uneven and insufficient social development, examining the relationship between the official rotation system and the quality of government services offers an effective guide to addressing government misconduct and reducing wealth disparities. This study employs a public goods game experiment to simulate the investment scenario of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, focusing on three pivotal questions: Firstly, do the ‘assisting hand’ and the ‘grabbing hand’ of officials differ between developed and underdeveloped regions? Secondly, can the interregional rotation system enhance the ‘assisting hand’ and weaken the ‘grabbing hand’ in both areas? Lastly, can political tournaments more effectively alleviate the issue of ‘government misconduct’? The experimental results reveal: Firstly, low economic growth potential limits the ‘assisting hand’ of officials while fostering the ‘grabbing hand’; secondly, the interregional rotation system strengthens the ‘assisting hand’ in underdeveloped areas but weakens it in developed regions; finally, compared to the interregional rotation system, the tournament system reinforces the ‘assisting hand’ in developed regions. These findings provide micro-level insights into the relationship between official behavior and regional characteristics, and offer significant implications for the reform of governance policies.