IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/recjxx/v21y2025i2p471-480.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Oligopoly, collusion, entry and welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Suryaprakash Mishra

Abstract

This paper analyses and shows the effects of entry into oligopoly. While entry affects prices and output, it may or may not impact welfare. However, the same in different oligopolistic set-ups has divergent and far-reaching welfare consequences. Specifically, we work with the $n$n-firm Cournot and Bertrand set-ups and evaluate the effects of entry on collusion and welfare. Entry may be a more effective policy tool to counter collusion in Bertrand than the Cournot framework. Our results are novel and of policy importance.

Suggested Citation

  • Suryaprakash Mishra, 2025. "Oligopoly, collusion, entry and welfare," European Competition Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(2), pages 471-480, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:recjxx:v:21:y:2025:i:2:p:471-480
    DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2024.2440225
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/17441056.2024.2440225
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/17441056.2024.2440225?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:recjxx:v:21:y:2025:i:2:p:471-480. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/recj .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.