Strategies for shore power facility utilisation under government subsidies: a three-party evolutionary game and simulation analysis

The global shipping industry has prioritised reducing air pollutants by implementing various policies related to shore power in recent years. Despite these initiatives, both ports and shipping companies exhibit a low willingness to use shore power, resulting in substantial resource waste. Existing multi-party game studies on shore power simulations mostly targeted a static outcomes, lacking insights into dynamic subsidy allocation based on stakeholder interactions. Moreover, studies have often treated the influencing factors of the shipping sector as broad and vague concepts, making it challenging to identify the key determinants affecting stakeholders’ willingness to use shore power comprehensively. This paper aims to addresses these gaps by incorporating specific parameters into an evolutionary game model. By applying the stability theorem of differential equations, we determine the equilibrium points and assess their stability. Simulations are conducted in Matlab to explore the evolution of strategic choices for promoting shore power and evaluate the impact of various factors on ships’ shore power choices. The findings provide insights for enhancing shore power adoption through targeted policies and optimal incentives, thereby contributing to more effective environmental strategies within the shipping industry.